Air Defense Artillery Online

12 September 2007

The Chadian Affaire
A French Hawk Battery Engages a Tupolev-22 Bomber
by
Gaston J. Dessornes

In August 2007, Russia reacted to the proposed stationing of components of the U.S. missile defense system in Central Europe by reviving the Soviet Union’s Cold War-era practice of flying bombers on long-range patrols over the North Atlantic and Pacific. No one today supposes that the relatively slow, easily detectable Soviet-era bombers pose a serious challenge to modern-day fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems, but this was not always the case. During the Cold War, Soviet long-range bombers posed a tremendous challenge to “Free World” air defense units. Soldiers assigned to U.S., NATO and French Hawk missile batteries expressed confidence in their ability to stop the Soviets' long-range bombers, but only French Hawk missile crewmen were put to the actual test. The lonevirtually forgottenengagement between a Soviet long-range bomber and a Hawk missile battery took place, not as expected on the Cold War’s front lines in Europe, but in North Africa.


A Short Background

As France withdrew from its North African colonies after World War II, it granted Chad the status of overseas territory, and in 1960, it granted Chad, full independence. However, France never cut it ties to Chad or its other former colonies. Chad, a land-locked country situated in the confines of the Sahara and surrounded by less-than-friendly neighbors, sought France’s help more than any other African country. One of its archenemies to the north—Libya’s Gaddafi—supported rebellious tribes that regularly threatened the various regimes in adjacent countries. Chad became the scene of numerous coups, countercoups and tribal infighting. In short, this country, large in real estate but small in population and means, has had a very turbulent history in its young existence.
 

Learn More About the Chadian-Libyan Conflict

"The Chadian-Libyan Conflict was a state of sporadic warfare events in Chad between 1978 and 1987, but Libyan involvement in Chad's internal affairs predated 1978 and even Muammar al-Gaddafi's rise to power in 1969, beginning with the extension of the Chadian Civil War to northern Chad in 1968.The conflict was marked by a series of four separate Libyan interventions in Chad, taking place in 1978, 1979, 1980–1981 and 1983–1987. In all of these occasions Gaddafi had the support of a number of factions participating in the civil war, while Libya's opponents relied on the support of the French government, which intervened militarily to save the Chadian government in 1978, 1983 and 1986."—Wikipedia

 

 

Opération Épervier

On February 10, 1986, Gaddafi's forces opened a major offensive whose ultimate goal was the capture of N'Djamena, the Chadian capital. After Libyan aircraft bombed N'Djamena, the French reacted by launching Opération Épervier, which translates to "Operation Sparrowhawk" in English. French commandos secured Camp Dubut, near N'Djamena, for the French Air Force contingent, which consisted of six F1 Mirages and  four Jaguar fighter-bombers, a French Navy Air Surveillance Breguet-Atlantique aircraft, and a KC-135 air tanker. France also installed surveillance radars and deployed a short-range, low-altitude Crotale surface-to-air missile battery around the capital. The Crotale battery effectively eliminated low-altitude bombing as an option for Libyan pilots; any future air attacks would have to be made from high altitudes. However, these measures did not deter the Libyans, who were quick to exploit the border area’s confusing geography, from trying to fly over the capital.

The map at left shows the area around N'Djamena, the capital city of Chad. (Click map to view larger image.) At top right, an F1 Mirage patrols over Chad. At right, B3/403rd Régiment disembarks from a U.S. Air Force C5 Galaxy as Opération Épervier gets underway.

Owing to the number of political borders sharing the shores of Lake Chad (Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad), air traffic in the border area was, to say the least, chaotic.  It was a de-facto free-flying zone. Few pilots bothered to submit flight plans, large aircraft en route to Mecca constantly traversed the airspace, general aviation airplanes zigzagged around, European airliners took shortcuts across Chad to save gas, and the pilots of “official” aircraft refused to obey air controllers!

The capital city, N’Djamena, is located off-center vis-à-vis the country’s landmass and is within 15 milesall distances are in nautical milesof its western-most border. Even if the military could monitor the air traffic over the neighboring countries, it could not engage any intruders over the borders without retribution, political or otherwise. This situation left a wide opening on the western flank of the city’s air defense, as it was impossible, even with the fastest fighters in the air 24/7, to interdict, an eastbound aircraft once it entered Chadian airspace before it reached the country’s capital.

On March 1986, the French Air Transport Command, aided by four U.S. Air Force C5 Galaxy cargo planes, transported a reinforced Hawk battery (B3) from the 403rd Régiment D’Artillerie Antiaérienne to Chad. Since 1966, when France left NATO, the French Hawk regiments had been assigned to domestic air defense. The French high command had neither planned nor prepared for overseas Hawk operations and was caught off guard by the government’s abrupt decision to deploy the Hawk battery. As a result, the deployment’s logistics were a bit nightmarish, but thanks to having continued American-inspired NATO practices, the Hawk battery’s equipment was in top shape and the personnel were at the ready.

 

The Tactical Situation

B3/403 became operational 3 March 1986 and would remain in Chad until November 1989, when it returned home. The battery was deployed in the northwestern part of the city’s airfield and was tasked to: ”Integrate within the air defense command to protect N’Djamena city at high-, medium-, and low-altitudes, within 20 nautical miles radius [35 kilometers] and up to 50 000 feet [18,000 meters], 24 hours a day."

The existing Air Management Element (EME) was comprised of a squadron of jet fighters, an Air Force SAM Crotale missile unit, along with its Very Short-Range (VSHORAD) 20-mm guns, plus a Chadian Army 40-mm gun unit.  A long-range Air Force Area Surveillance Radar (Centaure) ensured the air coverage.  The coordination was through Air Force CETAC (tactical cell) with a Hawk liaison officer.  Additionally, the Army deployed a couple of old AN/TPS-1D radars as anti-radiation missile decoys. The decoy's antenna reflectors were modified to make them better anti-radiation targets.

The photo at top left shows B3/403rd deployed for action. The Hawk battery command post is at center and the Hawk Pulse Acquisition Radar (PAR) is to the right. The launchers are not visible. The photo at top right shows the Centaur Radar. The photo at bottom left shows the PAR while the photo at bottom right shows a B3/403 Hawk launcher at action station.

Thus, began a long and monotonous air surveillance operation in the middle of nowhere that,  without help from other Hawk regiments and solid logistical support, could have drained the personnel and strained the equipment. The living conditions were Spartan.

Soon, it appeared that the Hawk Pulse Acquisition Radar (PAR) and the Air Force Surveillance Radar did not get along well together due to interferences. Sand was everywhere. The extreme dryness of the land, not surprisingly, prevented good equipment grounding. The Saharan direct heat also was a factor. It was especially hard on the missiles, but it also adversely affected the Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar (CWAR) and the Battery Control Center (BCC). When it rained, it poured, and the battery emplacements were flooded by sudden rains storms. On the spot ingenuity and shop engineering took care of the problems, but lessons were learnt.

At left, B3/403rd soldiers erect a collapsible sun shield to protect their Hawk missile launcher from the effects of the desert sun. Sudden rain storms, right, swamped the battery area.


The Assault 

(0650 Hours, 7 September 1987) The Hawk battery was on “Standby Action” and the night crew was about to be relieved by the day shift. A pair of FI Mirages fighters (Condor Whisky and Condor X-Ray), along with the slower Breguet-Atlantique aircraft, had been patrolling over Chad since 0400 hours. The KC-135-F was flying in circles, waiting to refuel the FI Mirages. At 0655 hours Condor patrol was about 55 miles north of N’Djamena.

Coming from the North, Libya instigated two simultaneous bombing raids with two Tupolev-22 bombers: one targeting N’Djamena; the other targeting Abeche farther to the east. (Crotale missile fire units engaged bombers attack Abeche without success.) The Libyan bombers destined for N'Djamena could not hope to avoid detection. To avoid being intercepted, they detoured around the Chadian borders as long as possible, mingling with civilian air traffic.

The map at left shows the routes Tupolev-22 bombers, similar to those above, followed during their 1986 attack on the Chadian capital. (Click map to view larger image.)

 

Firing Sequence
         
(Time (T) 0655) The Air Force Surveillance Radar (Centaure) detected a track on Azimuth 305, range 100Klm, Heading 130 toward N’Djamena city. Altitude unknown. There was no identification, friend or foe (IFF), response. The Air Controller classified the track as “unknown” and advised the Hawk BCC commander. At the same time the BCC observed, on its PAR, an erratic track on Azimuth 270, Range 100Klm. IFF challenge was negative on mode 1 and 3. On the BCC scopes the size of the echo indicated a “big fish”

The echoes that appeared on scopes B3/403rd Battery Control Center's scopes, echoes indicated a "big fish."


         
(T+2'30) The Air Controller directed Condor's two F1 Mirage Condors, now north of N’Djamena, to begin an intercept on a target situated over the state of Cameroon.  Heading 210, Range 31 miles. Condor patrol dropped its fuel tanks, turned 180 degrees, and accelerated to Mach 0.98. The leader flew at 24,000 feet and his wingman at 19,000 feet. Soon, they both got radar contacts on a target Heading 215, Range about 28 miles, Altitude 18,000 and 12,000 feet respectively
          
(T+2'45) The Hawk PAR reported solid constant radar returns at Range 55 Klm. The Air Controller prescribed to keep on tracking. On request from the Air Controller, both HPIRs then locked-on the target, using ADP mode without any problems. Sensing an eventual firing to a “flyaway” target, the TCO selected Bravo Section because of its more experienced operator and switched to HPI mode.  Alpha section remained on ADP’s. Bravo stated: Signal strength High, Altitude 4000m, Speed 1000Kl/h. Raid strength: one.
        
 (T+3'00) Condor Whisky confirmed its radar tracking. Heading 130.
         
(T+3'15) The Air Controller advised the Air Operation Officer of a probable engagement and triggered general alert with its siren.
        
 (T+3’45) The Chief Controller activated the radar decoy (AN/TPS-1D) and shut down the Centaure’s transmitter as well as the airport Tactical Air Navigation system (Tacan). The Air Controller continued to call the intruding aircraft by radio, but was unsuccessful.
          (T+4'00) The Hawk BCC reported "In Range." The TCO noted the rapid altitude decrease of the incoming aircraft as it postured for an attack. The TCO assistant triggered the BCC siren.
         
(T+4’15) The TCO assistant ordered Condor patrol to cut short the intercept in progress. When told, “Break off. Will commence firing,” both Condor aircraft immediately turned around by the right and by the left. They were then about 15 miles from the city, their radar still showing the target at eight miles, 4,000 feet.
        
 (T+5’00) The Air Controller reactivated the Centaure Radar and shut down the decoy. As soon as he estimated the attacker to be within the Chadian border, he ordered the Hawk battery to execute the intercept.  The Liaison Officer transmitted to the BCC. The target distance was eight miles from the battery.
       
   (T+5’20) Bravo Section opened fire, but its missile was a dud and failed to leave its launcher.  Alpha Section was then selected, and it immediately opened fire; four seconds later the missile was heard leaving its launcher.  Soon after, the Bravo Section operator reported the kill from the diminishing Doppler audio. The kill took place three to four miles away.
         
(T+5’30) Receiving the report of the initial Hawk misfire, the Air Controller ordered Mirage Condor X-Ray, which was on standby for refueling by the KC-135 and situated to east of the city, to Heading 300 for an intercept mission that would eventually proved unnecessary.
        
(T+5’45) The Chief Controller received the kill report as well as a new radar contact from Condor Whisky, 16 miles away. He ordered Condor Whisky to engage the newly reported target. However shortly after, the contact was lost at range six miles from the Mirage.

Above left, the TU-22 bomber crashes and burns on impact. At top right, locals gather to examine the debris. At bottom left, French soldiers inspect an unexploded 1,200Kg bomb that fell intact with its harness.


The Results
    
The Libyan bomber was hit as it was opening its bomb bay. The plane debris scattered around the base. One 1,500Kg bomb fell intact with its attaching harness, another burnt on impact without exploding, and small caliber ammunition burnt and burst on the ground.

      Contrary to what was initially thought (T + 5’45) there was only one attacker over the city. It is assumed that the two plots seen on the fighter’s radars came from the Tupolev’s electronic countermeasure system, however the electronic countermeasures did not affect the Hawk radars. The radar returns seen after the TU-22 destruction may have been from the Breguet-Atlantique, which dived precipitously after its electronics detected a tracking radar signal.

     Technical manuals and personal documents in the wreckage were in Cyrillic fonts. Photos clearly not taken in Africa found on the partially charred bodies of the three crew members showed young blond men and their girlfriends: The pilots were probably not Libyan!

French Personnel
Tactical Control Operator    Lieutenant AZNAR.
Assistant Tactical Operator Warrant Officer TÉDESCO.
A Section Console  Sergeant HAEN.
B Section Console    Sergeant PUNTEL.
CWAR Console C/Corporal LAVILLE
Air Controller Lieutenant DUHAYON (Air Force)
Hawk Liaison Officer  1st Lieutenant ORLANDI
Condor Whisky Patrol
Lieutenant BRILL (Mirage pilot) Lieutenant DELANNOY (Mirage pilot)

 

The Fog of War

          It would be gratifying to think that in success all goes well and that “the victory” in itself is the testimony!  Alas, the “Fog of War,” as the following items reveal, will forever be with the military.

  • A thorough investigation of the Bravo Section misfire showed that it could have been entirely avoided had the launcher’s “daily check” been performed. That day someone decided that time was of the essence and that time to perform the check was not available. Thanks to good training and hours spent in fire simulation (Simulator AN/MPQ-21), the changeover to Alfa Section was timely and effective.
     

  • Unmentioned in the firing sequence and not confirmed nor denied by the French Air Service, is the story that one Mirage pilot, to gain speed to intercept the TU-22, dropped his aircraft's AA MAGIC missile instead of its fuel tank, thus reducing the chance to fulfill an intercept mission that thankfully was not needed. Errare humanum est !

     

  • A friendly fire incident was narrowly avoided a day after the intercept. A U.S. Air Force C-141 wandering over Chad was presumed hostile (no IFF response). A Mirage fighter initiated a firing sequence, but at the very last moment, the pilot's wingman visually identified the U.S. plane as friendly.

Conclusions

1.             In this action, the French Air Service showed its limitations: to be complete, an air defense umbrella had to be complemented by effective specific SAM.

2.              The momentous decision by the local Air Force commander to direct fire through a field telephone via a liaison officer rather than using the the modern and available Hawk built-in Automatic Data Transmission (ADT) could have proven fatal had the attackers carried out a “saturating” action with more aircraft or simply have been a bit more pugnacious. (The word "gadget" (in French) was used in a meeting prior to the engage to derisively describe the ADT system.)  Under these circumstances, the Hawk victory was that much more admirable for the Artillery team and the Air Force Controller were able to save the day in spite of inter-service pettiness in higher echelons.

3.             The Raytheon equipment performed flawlessly as designed under very difficult conditions. Yet, the European Hawk built for the European theater was different enough that it needed extra protection from the African sun. During operation Desert Storm, similar problems were encountered that triggered the introduction of a NAMSA kit. The electrical interferences between the Hawk PAR and the Centaure were smartly resolved by shortly blanking one radar reception by the other through a simple coaxial cable. Another problem was with the system grounding , which was eliminated when a central grounding wellabundantly wateredtied up every electrical device. The technical support provided by the European Hawk organization and the Ordnance personnel (DSDR) was outstanding.

Many of the French personnel who participated in the Opération Épervier engagement had trained at the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas. France's last aerial victory prior to Opération Épervier had occurred in 1945, when Pierre Clostermann, the highest-scoring French ace of World War II,  recorded the last of his 33 air victories. Thanks to relentless drills with the “Hawk Simulator," operational readiness inspections, actual firing practices, and to some extent, U.S.-inspired doctrine, the 403rd RAA with its glorious past could state anew: Mission Accomplished!
 

Epilogue

          Coincidently, on the very day of the engagement, Col. Petit, the regiment’s commanding officer, was traveling to Chad to reconnoiter the eventual deployment of a second Hawk battery further north in the Aozou region around the city of Faya-Largeau. A highly successful Chadian operation had captured an impressive amount of modern equipment from behind the Iron Curtain. NATO countries were delighted to finally put their hands on some of the most advanced equipment the Russians had to offer, but retaliation was expected; however, the city was in shambles after a series of pitch battles and retaliation was expected.

          The landing of the mission lead by Petit immediately after the N’Djamena air victory was no secret, nor was its purpose intended to be. It demonstrated that France was getting ready for an escalation if needed.
 

Statement by Regimental Commander

On September 7, 1987, the French Air Defense Artillery achieved a symbolic victory. Since 1945, the success of N’Djamena has been exceptional and unique. It has been accomplished thanks to the perfect inter-Service cooperation worked out then, and further developed since.
 

Answering the call to duty in a mission that was at best out of the ordinary, and overcoming very difficult living conditions for so long, the men and women of  Opération Épervier brilliantly demonstrated their professionalism and set a new standard of excellence.

 

For the next generation of artillery personnel of the 21st Century, this feat will be a keen example of dedication and commitment to their trade.



[Signed]

Colonel JP Petit.

Commanding Officer

403rd Régiment D’Artillerie

 

          Negotiations soon followed and all warring parties and factions arrived at a status quo ante. Eventually, the power shifted, as expected, from one rebellious party to another party—one that rebelled against Qaddafi at that!

           In October 1988, Chad resumed formal diplomatic relations with Libya. The political situation stabilized, but still prudent, France progressively “de-escalated” its military posture and waited until November 1989 to return the 403rd RAA to its intended purpose: home defense. Fewer than 1,000 French troops, who were assigned to “humanitarian” missions such as mine-clearing, remained in Chad.

 


Gaston J. Dessornes is a former French Army chief warrant officer. Before training at Fort Bliss, Texas, on the Nike and the Hawk missile systems, he fired 90mm and 40mm antiaircraft guns as well as the WWII M45 “Quad 50,” etc. Retired, he lives in California and proudly wears the insignia of the Order of the Oozlefinch. (E-mail the author at gaselen@earthlink.net.)
 

Acknowledgement

 Part of this paper is extracted from the compilation of various reports and memoirs from Colonel Petit, the 403rd RAA commander. For the most part we have reproduced the firing sequence as described by Col Petit, who was present as the action occurred, and reconstructed using reports and interviews from the participants immediately after the engagement, while it was still “fresh.” 
 

Biographical References

Colonel Petit:

Official report, Ministère de la Défense, Paris.

Letters, Correspondence and Memoirs. 

 

Interviews (Through Col. Petit)

Col. B Aznar (then 1st Lt. and TCO), LtCol. P Dentinger, Col. JM Guérin (Ordnance), Col. F Lefebvre, Col. JP Lozinguez, LtCol. P Peralta.

 

Personal Notes and/or Correspondence

Col. P Balliot, Lt. Col. F Grall (Ordnance), Lt. Col. H.Havard, CE. P Marey, Lt. Col. D Martinerie.
 

Picture Credits

P Dentinger: B3 deployment, Centaure radar, B3 Going Home, Loading Galaxy, Crowd around the engine, Intact Bomb.
 

A Scavardo: BCC inside; Various Galaxy shots, including the “Unloading the Galaxy.”
J Girard: TU-22 burning, Missiles at battle station.
 

402nd RA, Internet Site: “7 Septembre: Sand or Mud”
 

Unknown: Missile covered from sun, all TU-22 and Mirage F1 pictures.