|
In
August 2007, Russia reacted to the proposed stationing of components
of the U.S. missile
defense system in Central Europe by reviving the Soviet Union’s
Cold War-era practice of flying bombers on
long-range patrols over the North Atlantic and Pacific. No one today
supposes that the relatively slow, easily detectable Soviet-era
bombers pose a serious challenge to modern-day fighter aircraft and
surface-to-air missile systems, but this was not always the case.
During the Cold War, Soviet long-range bombers posed a tremendous
challenge to “Free World” air defense units. Soldiers assigned to
U.S., NATO and French Hawk missile batteries expressed confidence in
their ability to stop the Soviets' long-range bombers, but only
French Hawk missile crewmen were put to the actual test. The lone—virtually
forgotten—engagement
between a Soviet long-range bomber and a Hawk missile battery took
place, not as expected on the Cold War’s front lines in Europe, but in
North Africa.
A Short Background
As France
withdrew from its North African colonies after World War II, it
granted Chad the status of overseas territory, and in 1960, it
granted Chad, full independence. However, France never cut it ties
to Chad or its other former colonies. Chad, a land-locked country
situated in the confines of the Sahara and surrounded by
less-than-friendly neighbors, sought France’s help more than any
other African country. One of its archenemies to the north—Libya’s
Gaddafi—supported rebellious tribes that regularly threatened the
various regimes in adjacent countries. Chad became the scene of
numerous coups, countercoups and tribal infighting. In short, this
country, large in real estate but small in population and means, has
had a very turbulent history in its young existence.
|
Learn
More About the Chadian-Libyan Conflict |
|
"The
Chadian-Libyan Conflict was a
state of sporadic warfare events in
Chad between 1978 and 1987, but Libyan
involvement in Chad's internal affairs
predated 1978 and even
Muammar al-Gaddafi's
rise to power in 1969, beginning
with the extension of the
Chadian Civil War
to northern Chad in 1968.The conflict
was marked by a series of four separate
Libyan interventions in Chad, taking
place in 1978, 1979, 1980–1981 and
1983–1987. In all of these occasions
Gaddafi had the support of a number of
factions participating in the civil war,
while Libya's opponents relied on the support of
the French government, which intervened
militarily to save the Chadian
government in 1978, 1983 and 1986."—Wikipedia
|
Opération Épervier
On
February 10, 1986, Gaddafi's
forces opened a major offensive whose ultimate goal was the capture
of N'Djamena, the Chadian capital. After Libyan aircraft bombed
N'Djamena, the French reacted by launching
Opération Épervier, which translates to
"Operation Sparrowhawk" in English. French commandos secured
Camp Dubut, near N'Djamena, for the French Air
Force contingent, which consisted of six F1 Mirages and
four Jaguar fighter-bombers, a French Navy Air Surveillance Breguet-Atlantique aircraft, and a KC-135 air tanker. France
also installed surveillance radars and deployed a short-range,
low-altitude Crotale surface-to-air missile battery around the
capital. The Crotale battery effectively eliminated low-altitude
bombing as an option for Libyan pilots; any future air attacks would
have to be made from high altitudes. However, these measures did not
deter the Libyans, who were quick to exploit the border area’s
confusing geography, from trying to fly over the capital.
Owing to the
number of political borders sharing the shores of Lake Chad (Niger,
Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad), air traffic in the border area was, to
say the least, chaotic. It was a de-facto free-flying zone. Few
pilots bothered to submit flight plans, large aircraft en route to
Mecca constantly traversed the airspace, general aviation airplanes
zigzagged around, European airliners took shortcuts across Chad to
save gas, and the pilots of “official” aircraft refused to obey air
controllers!
The capital city, N’Djamena, is located
off-center vis-à-vis the country’s landmass and is within 15 miles—all
distances are in nautical miles—of its western-most border. Even if the military could monitor the
air traffic over the neighboring countries, it could not engage
any intruders over the borders without retribution, political or
otherwise. This situation left a wide opening on the western flank
of the city’s air defense, as it was impossible, even with the
fastest fighters in the air 24/7, to interdict, an eastbound
aircraft once it entered Chadian airspace before it reached the
country’s capital.
On March 1986,
the French Air Transport Command, aided by four U.S. Air Force C5
Galaxy cargo planes, transported a reinforced Hawk battery (B3) from
the 403rd Régiment D’Artillerie Antiaérienne
to Chad. Since
1966, when France left NATO, the French Hawk regiments had been
assigned to domestic air defense. The French high command had
neither planned nor prepared for overseas Hawk operations and was
caught off guard by the government’s abrupt decision to deploy the
Hawk battery. As a result, the deployment’s logistics were a bit
nightmarish, but thanks to having continued American-inspired NATO
practices, the Hawk battery’s equipment was in top shape and the
personnel were at the ready.
The Tactical Situation
B3/403
became operational 3 March 1986 and would remain in Chad until
November 1989, when it returned home. The battery was deployed in
the northwestern part of the city’s airfield and was tasked to:
”Integrate within the air defense command to protect N’Djamena
city at high-, medium-, and low-altitudes, within 20 nautical miles
radius [35 kilometers] and up to 50 000 feet [18,000 meters], 24
hours a day."
The existing Air Management Element (EME) was comprised of a
squadron of jet fighters, an Air Force SAM Crotale missile unit,
along with its Very Short-Range (VSHORAD) 20-mm guns, plus a Chadian
Army 40-mm gun unit. A long-range Air Force Area Surveillance Radar
(Centaure) ensured the air coverage. The coordination was through
Air Force CETAC (tactical cell) with a Hawk liaison officer.
Additionally, the Army deployed a couple of old AN/TPS-1D radars as
anti-radiation missile decoys. The decoy's antenna reflectors were
modified to make them better anti-radiation targets.
|
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
|
The photo
at top left shows B3/403rd deployed for action. The Hawk
battery command post is at center and the Hawk Pulse
Acquisition Radar (PAR) is to the right. The launchers
are not visible. The photo at top right shows the
Centaur Radar. The photo at bottom left shows the PAR
while the photo at bottom right shows a B3/403 Hawk
launcher at action station. |
Thus, began a long and monotonous air surveillance operation in the
middle of nowhere that, without help from other Hawk regiments
and solid logistical support, could have drained the personnel and strained
the equipment. The living conditions were Spartan.
Soon, it appeared that the Hawk Pulse Acquisition Radar (PAR) and
the Air Force Surveillance Radar did not get along well together due
to interferences. Sand was everywhere. The extreme dryness of the land, not surprisingly, prevented good equipment
grounding. The Saharan direct heat also was a factor. It was
especially hard on the missiles, but it also adversely affected the
Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar (CWAR) and the Battery Control
Center (BCC). When it rained, it poured, and the battery
emplacements were flooded by sudden rains storms. On the spot ingenuity and shop engineering took care
of the problems, but lessons were learnt.
|
 |
 |
|
At left, B3/403rd soldiers erect a collapsible sun
shield to protect their Hawk missile launcher from the
effects of the desert sun. Sudden rain storms, right,
swamped the battery area. |
The Assault
(0650
Hours, 7 September 1987)
The Hawk battery was on “Standby Action” and the night crew was
about to be relieved by the day shift. A pair of FI Mirages fighters
(Condor Whisky and Condor X-Ray), along with the slower Breguet-Atlantique aircraft, had been patrolling over Chad since
0400 hours. The KC-135-F was flying in circles, waiting to refuel
the FI Mirages. At 0655 hours Condor patrol was about 55 miles
north of N’Djamena.
Coming from the
North, Libya instigated two simultaneous bombing raids with two
Tupolev-22 bombers: one targeting N’Djamena; the other targeting Abeche
farther to the east. (Crotale
missile fire units engaged bombers attack Abeche without success.) The Libyan bombers
destined for N'Djamena could not hope to avoid
detection. To avoid being intercepted, they detoured around the
Chadian borders as long as possible, mingling with civilian air traffic.
 |
 |
|
The map at
left shows the routes
Tupolev-22 bombers,
similar to those above, followed during their 1986 attack on the Chadian
capital. (Click map to view larger image.) |
Firing Sequence
(Time (T) 0655)
The Air Force
Surveillance Radar (Centaure) detected a track on Azimuth 305, range
100Klm, Heading 130 toward N’Djamena city. Altitude unknown. There was no identification, friend or foe (IFF),
response. The Air Controller classified the track as “unknown” and
advised the Hawk BCC commander. At the same time the BCC observed, on
its PAR, an erratic track on Azimuth 270, Range 100Klm. IFF challenge
was negative on mode 1 and 3. On the BCC
scopes the size of the echo indicated a “big fish”
 |
The echoes that appeared
on scopes B3/403rd Battery Control Center's scopes,
echoes indicated a "big fish." |
(T+2'30)
The Air Controller directed Condor's two F1 Mirage
Condors, now north of N’Djamena, to begin an intercept on a target
situated over the state of Cameroon. Heading 210, Range 31 miles.
Condor patrol dropped its fuel tanks, turned 180 degrees, and
accelerated to Mach 0.98. The leader flew at 24,000 feet and his wingman at 19,000
feet. Soon, they both got radar contacts on a target
Heading 215, Range about 28 miles, Altitude 18,000 and 12,000 feet
respectively
(T+2'45)
The Hawk PAR
reported solid constant radar returns at Range 55 Klm. The Air
Controller prescribed to keep on tracking.
On request from the Air Controller, both HPIRs
then locked-on the
target, using ADP mode without any problems. Sensing an eventual firing
to a “flyaway” target, the TCO selected Bravo Section because of its
more experienced operator and switched to HPI mode.
Alpha section
remained on ADP’s. Bravo stated: Signal strength High, Altitude
4000m, Speed 1000Kl/h. Raid strength: one.
(T+3'00)
Condor Whisky
confirmed its radar tracking. Heading 130.
(T+3'15) The Air Controller
advised the Air Operation Officer of a probable engagement and
triggered general alert with its siren. (T+3’45)
The Chief
Controller activated the radar decoy
(AN/TPS-1D) and shut down the Centaure’s transmitter as well as the
airport Tactical Air Navigation system (Tacan). The Air Controller continued to call the intruding aircraft by radio,
but was unsuccessful.
(T+4'00)
The Hawk BCC
reported "In Range." The TCO noted the rapid altitude decrease of
the incoming aircraft as it postured for an attack. The TCO
assistant triggered the BCC siren.
(T+4’15)
The TCO assistant ordered Condor patrol to cut short the
intercept in progress. When told, “Break off. Will commence firing,” both Condor aircraft immediately turned
around by the right and by the left. They were then about 15
miles from the city, their radar still showing the target at eight
miles, 4,000 feet.
(T+5’00)
The Air Controller
reactivated the Centaure Radar and shut down the decoy. As soon as he
estimated the attacker to be within the Chadian border, he ordered
the Hawk battery to execute the intercept. The Liaison Officer transmitted
to the BCC. The target distance was eight miles from the battery.
(T+5’20)
Bravo Section
opened fire, but its missile was a dud and failed to leave its
launcher. Alpha Section
was then selected, and it immediately opened fire; four seconds later the missile was
heard leaving its launcher. Soon after, the Bravo Section operator
reported the kill from the diminishing Doppler audio. The kill took
place three to four miles away.
(T+5’30)
Receiving
the report of the initial Hawk misfire, the Air Controller ordered Mirage Condor X-Ray,
which was on standby for refueling by the KC-135 and situated to east of
the city, to Heading 300 for an intercept mission that would
eventually proved unnecessary.
(T+5’45)
The Chief
Controller received the kill report as well as a new radar contact
from Condor Whisky, 16 miles away. He ordered
Condor Whisky to engage the newly reported target. However shortly
after, the contact was lost at range six miles from the Mirage.
The Results
The Libyan
bomber was hit as it was opening its bomb bay. The plane debris
scattered around the base. One 1,500Kg bomb fell intact with its
attaching harness, another burnt on impact without exploding, and
small caliber ammunition burnt and burst on the ground.
Contrary to what
was initially thought (T + 5’45) there was only one attacker over the city. It
is assumed that the two plots seen on the fighter’s radars came from
the Tupolev’s electronic countermeasure system, however the electronic
countermeasures did not affect
the Hawk radars.
The radar
returns seen after the TU-22 destruction may have been from the Breguet-Atlantique,
which dived precipitously after its electronics
detected a tracking radar signal.
Technical
manuals and personal documents in the wreckage were in Cyrillic
fonts. Photos clearly not taken in Africa found on the partially
charred bodies of the three crew members showed young blond men and
their girlfriends: The pilots were probably not Libyan!
|
French Personnel |
| Tactical Control Operator |
Lieutenant AZNAR. |
| Assistant Tactical Operator |
Warrant Officer TÉDESCO. |
| A Section Console |
Sergeant HAEN. |
| B Section Console |
Sergeant PUNTEL.
|
| CWAR Console |
C/Corporal LAVILLE |
| Air Controller |
Lieutenant DUHAYON (Air Force) |
|
Hawk
Liaison Officer |
1st
Lieutenant ORLANDI |
|
Condor Whisky Patrol |
|
Lieutenant
BRILL (Mirage pilot) |
Lieutenant
DELANNOY (Mirage pilot) |
The Fog of War
It would be
gratifying to think that in success all goes well and that “the
victory” in itself is the testimony! Alas, the “Fog of War,”
as the following items reveal, will
forever be with the military.
-
A thorough investigation of the Bravo Section
misfire showed that it could have been entirely avoided had the
launcher’s “daily check” been performed. That day someone
decided that time was of the essence and that time to perform
the check was not available. Thanks to
good training and hours spent in fire simulation (Simulator
AN/MPQ-21), the changeover to Alfa Section was timely and effective.
-
Unmentioned in the firing
sequence and not confirmed nor denied by the French Air
Service, is the story that one Mirage
pilot, to gain speed to intercept the TU-22, dropped his
aircraft's AA MAGIC missile instead of its fuel tank, thus
reducing the chance to fulfill an intercept mission that
thankfully was not needed.
Errare humanum est !
-
A friendly fire incident was narrowly avoided
a day after the intercept. A U.S. Air Force C-141 wandering over
Chad was presumed hostile (no IFF response). A Mirage fighter
initiated a firing sequence, but at the very last moment, the pilot's wingman visually identified the U.S. plane
as friendly.
Conclusions
1.
In this action, the French Air Service showed its limitations: to be
complete, an air defense umbrella had to be complemented by
effective specific SAM.
2.
The momentous decision by the local Air Force
commander to direct fire through a field telephone via a liaison
officer rather than using the the modern and available Hawk built-in Automatic Data Transmission (ADT)
could have proven fatal had the attackers carried out a
“saturating” action with more aircraft or simply have been a bit more pugnacious.
(The word
"gadget" (in French) was used in a meeting prior to the
engage to derisively describe the ADT system.)
Under these
circumstances, the Hawk victory was that much more admirable for
the Artillery team and the Air Force Controller were able to save
the day in spite of inter-service pettiness in higher echelons.
3.
The Raytheon equipment performed flawlessly as designed
under very difficult conditions. Yet, the European Hawk built for
the European theater was different enough that it needed extra
protection from the African sun. During operation Desert Storm,
similar problems were encountered that triggered the introduction of a NAMSA kit. The
electrical interferences between the Hawk PAR and the Centaure were
smartly resolved by shortly blanking one radar reception by the
other through a simple coaxial cable. Another problem was with the
system grounding , which was eliminated when a central grounding well—abundantly watered—tied up every electrical device.
The technical support provided by the European Hawk
organization and the Ordnance personnel (DSDR) was outstanding.
Many of the
French personnel who participated in the
Opération Épervier
engagement had trained at the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery
School, Fort Bliss, Texas. France's last aerial victory prior to Opération Épervier
had occurred in 1945, when Pierre Clostermann, the highest-scoring
French ace of World War II, recorded the last of his 33 air
victories. Thanks to relentless drills with the “Hawk Simulator,"
operational readiness inspections, actual firing practices, and
to some extent, U.S.-inspired doctrine, the 403rd RAA
with its glorious past could state anew:
Mission Accomplished!
Epilogue
Coincidently, on the very day of the
engagement, Col. Petit, the regiment’s commanding officer, was traveling to Chad
to reconnoiter the eventual deployment of a second Hawk battery
further north in the Aozou region around the city of Faya-Largeau.
A highly successful Chadian operation had captured an impressive
amount of modern equipment from behind the Iron Curtain. NATO
countries were delighted to finally put their hands on some of the
most advanced equipment the Russians had to offer, but retaliation was expected;
however, the city was in shambles after a series of pitch battles
and retaliation was expected.
The landing of
the mission lead by Petit immediately after the N’Djamena air
victory was no secret, nor was its purpose intended to be. It
demonstrated that France was getting ready for an escalation if
needed.
 |
Statement by Regimental Commander
On September 7, 1987, the French Air Defense
Artillery achieved a symbolic victory. Since 1945, the success of
N’Djamena has been exceptional and unique. It has been accomplished
thanks to the perfect inter-Service cooperation worked out then, and
further developed since.
Answering the call to duty in a mission that was
at best out of the ordinary, and overcoming very difficult living
conditions for so long, the men and women of
Opération Épervier
brilliantly demonstrated their professionalism and set a new
standard of excellence.
For the next generation of artillery personnel of
the 21st Century, this feat will be a keen example of dedication and
commitment to their trade.
[Signed]
Colonel JP Petit.
Commanding Officer
403rd
Régiment D’Artillerie
|
 |
Negotiations soon followed and all warring parties and factions arrived at a
status quo ante. Eventually, the power shifted, as expected, from
one rebellious party to another party—one
that rebelled against
Qaddafi at that!
In October 1988,
Chad resumed formal diplomatic relations with Libya. The political
situation stabilized, but still prudent, France progressively
“de-escalated” its military posture and waited until November 1989 to return the 403rd RAA to its intended purpose: home defense. Fewer than 1,000
French troops, who were assigned to “humanitarian” missions such as
mine-clearing, remained in Chad.
Gaston J. Dessornes is a former French Army
chief warrant officer.
Before training at Fort Bliss, Texas, on the Nike and the
Hawk missile systems, he fired 90mm and 40mm antiaircraft guns as
well as the WWII M45 “Quad 50,” etc. Retired, he lives in California and proudly wears the insignia of
the Order of the Oozlefinch. (E-mail the author at
gaselen@earthlink.net.)
Acknowledgement
Part of this
paper is extracted from the compilation of various reports and
memoirs from Colonel Petit, the 403rd RAA commander. For the most part we have reproduced the firing sequence as
described by Col Petit, who was present as the action occurred, and reconstructed using reports and
interviews from the participants immediately after the engagement,
while it was still “fresh.”
Biographical
References
Colonel Petit:
Official report, Ministère de la Défense, Paris.
Letters,
Correspondence and Memoirs.
Interviews
(Through Col. Petit)
Col. B Aznar (then 1st Lt.
and TCO), LtCol. P Dentinger, Col. JM Guérin (Ordnance),
Col. F Lefebvre, Col. JP Lozinguez, LtCol. P Peralta.
Personal
Notes and/or Correspondence
Col. P Balliot,
Lt. Col. F Grall (Ordnance), Lt. Col. H.Havard, CE. P Marey, Lt. Col. D
Martinerie.
Picture
Credits
P Dentinger:
B3 deployment, Centaure radar, B3 Going Home, Loading Galaxy, Crowd
around the engine, Intact Bomb.
A Scavardo:
BCC inside; Various Galaxy shots, including the “Unloading the
Galaxy.”
J Girard:
TU-22 burning, Missiles at battle station.
402nd RA,
Internet Site: “7 Septembre: Sand or Mud”
Unknown: Missile
covered from sun, all TU-22 and Mirage F1 pictures.
|